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Introduction
Unlike any Chinese alien before them, the passengers of the Golden
Venture waited on the shore while immigration officials combed
the water for more victims. And unlike any Chinese alien before
them, the passengers of the Golden Venture would become Clinton's
example--an effort to stop illegal alien smuggling from China.

Those that were rescued from the water just off the shoreline
of Long Island, NY, after their smuggling ship had run
aground on June 6, 1993, would spend the next several years
in detention centers, stirring a national debate. In the end, the
debate culminated into the 1996 Immigration Reform Act.
The passengers claimed to be seeking political asylum from
China's one-child policy. The Clinton Administration faced
the task of deciding what to do with illegal Chinese immigrants. Two main sides developed and tried to sway the
Administration in their favor. The first was the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), the Justice Department,
and several members of Congress, all of which maintained
that it was in the United States' best interest to repatriate
the Chinese nationals. The second was a group oflawyers
and activists who took up the Chinese immigrants' case.
The INS and its fellow supporters were successful in
prompting the government to adopt a much stricter immigration law in 1996, reducing the number of illegal Chinese
immigrants and the number of political asylum claims.
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However, human rights groups also affected US. policy by
suing the government, staging protests, and garnering support in Congress as well. Their efforts forced the government to include China's one-child policy as adequate basis
for political asylum, and they eventually convinced the
Clinton Administration to release the remaining victims of
the Golden Venture from detention. The Golden Venture
represents a larger issue for Chinese immigration to the
United States. On one side, the US. cannot sponsor an open
door policy, which would overload US. immigration and
asylum courts, as well as add to the smuggling industry and
crime in Chinese neighborhoods in the U .S. However, the
US. cannot ignore the human tragedy of Chinese immigrants seeking political refuge in the United States. This
public policy issue is further complicated by the involvement of interest groups, making it a case of bureaucratic
politics as well, as is seen in the formation of the 1996
Immigration Reform Act, where each group won some of
their objectives, without one particular group winning it all.

Theoretical Framework
James Madison defined an interest group (or what he called
a faction) as a number of citizens who come together

the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled in 1989 that the onechild policy was not grounds for political asylum. However,

because of a common interest or goal (Hamilton,Jay, and

President George Bush issued an executive order, over-ruling the

Madison 1787,46). In addition to this, an interest group

Board. When the Golden Venture incident occurred, the Clinton

seeks government action, usually in the form of legislation

Administration was in office. Most of the Chinese nationals who

that works in their favor. An interest group, for the purpose

were on the smuggling ship assumed that Clinton would sup-

of this paper, does not necessitate an organized body or

port Bush's ruling; however, Clinton referred back to the origi-

institution, but even a loosely associated group of individuals who are working for a similar cause, like many human

gal smuggling (Mangaliman 1993,45).

nal 1989 decision in an effort to decrease asylum abuse and ille-

rights groups. Interest groups can also be government

Interest groups started to formulate around this case when

bureaucracies, such as the INS or Justice Department. The

the Golden Venture grounded off the coastline of New York.

development of interest groups in a democratic system is

After the passengers were secured on the beach, they were

largely viewed by most political scientists as a natural

transported to jails, where many of them remained for years

process (Cigler and Loomis 1998,2). In fact, Madison's

(Cheng 1997, A07). Lawyers and activists in the surrounding

Federalist Paper #10 was written because he saw the
American system of government as lending itself to special

areas were spurred to action by this event arguing that the

interest groups. Interest groups seem to increase and multiply as society and institutions become more complex (6).

basis of their argument was the moral issue associated with

However, though this development is natural, it does not

INS was wrong to put political refugees in jail. The main
the one-child policy and forced abortions. These individuals
did not establish a cohesive organization in order to pursue

occur spontaneously. Most interest groups, particularly those

the Chinese's case, but many of their tactics towards the gov-

that emphasize public interest, arise in response to events or

ernment were the same as a formalized group.

disturbances, for example the organized resistance by draft-

The INS, whose main incentive is a bureaucratic interest in

aged men to US. war efforts in Vietnam (7). This is in con-

maintaining U.S. borders, argued against the Chinese immi-

trast to the very organized interest groups, such as professional or economical interest groups, which seek legislation

grants because of the correlation between illegal alien smuggling and crime in U.S. cities. The immigrants who are smug-

that will benefit their own members. In the groups dis-

gled into the US. have usually paid smugglers 20 to 30 thou-

cussed above, policy changes may benefit their own mem-

sand dollars. The Chinese are then forced into manual labor and

bers, but may also mean a shift in favor of a certain ideology or moral cause. Roger Hilsman says that these are inter-

servirude by those who loaned them the money. Women
among the group are often forced to work as prostirutes. And

est groups that see a particular moral issue as a part of the

sometimes, the smugglers use violence to exact their money

public good (1987,206).
An interest group's means to influence usually comes by lobby-

tribute to massive crime in Chinese neighborhoods. Both

ing. However, what lobbying may imply has a range of alterna-

groups used a variety of tactics common to interest groups in

(peVrez-Rivas and Rashbaum 1993, 7).These violations con-

tives. Interest groups can seek to influence government or leg-

order to persuade the president into acting in their favor. The

islation by contacting important actors in the government who
may be a friend or a supporter of the group (Hilsman 1987,

resulting legislation, the Immigration Reform Act of 1996,

212). The most controversial tactic oflate is campaign contri-

lawyers and activists and the internal influence of the

combined both the public movement by the human rights

butions given to political candidates. Publicity, either through

Immigration and Naruralization Service. Mter discussing the

the group's own mechanisms or through the media, also has a

history of Chinese immigration to the United States and the

large effect. Large interest groups (such as ideologically and

rise of smuggling, I will turn to the Golden Venture incident

racially determined groups) may be able to change legislation

and analyze the activities of the competing interest groups

or government policy by simply influencing their own mem-

and how they contributed to the formation of the

bers to vote in a certain way (213). Interest groups may

Immigration Reform Act of 1996.

demonstrate or use violence (214).There are also some smaller
activities that interest groups do on a regular basis; tracking leg-

History of Chinese Immigration to the United States

islation, submitting amici curiae brie15 to courts, contacting
elected representatives, and even filing their own law suits

Chinese immigration to the United States dates back to the

(215).These activities can result in the prevention, change, or

government passed the Exclusion Act, a racially based restric-

early 1850s.This trend continued until 1882, when the US.

even formation oflegislation, the issuing or over-riding of

tion on Chinese immigration (Burdman 1993,Al). The reversal

executive orders, and court decisions-thus affecting every

of the Exclusion Act in 1965 and other U.S. policy changes

branch of government, if the group is successful.

toward Chinese immigration occurred under the umbrella of

In the case of Chinese immigration and the Golden Venture,

political asylum as a result of the United States' growing policy
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to give refuge to those fleeing communist oppression.
"Asylum is the special refugee status given to all aliens who
can show they have a well-founded fear of persecution in
their native land" (Brown 1993,AS). In order to apply for
political asylum, the individual would need to physically
represent him or herself at one of the U.S. land border or
port of entry sites. Immigration officers, along with the
Attorney General, would decide whether the individual's
case justified granting asylum (U.S. Congress, House 1993).
The US. asylum policy included those who were fleeing for
political reasons, but not for economic reasons (Freedman
1993,Al). Furthermore, the original asylum law, though it

in 1990 that not only reiterated the US. commitment to safe
guarding Chinese student, against persecution, but also anyone
who might be fleeing their country's measures for population
control. This allowed immigrants to cite the one-child policy as
basis for political asylum (Gladwell and Stas.,en-I3erger 1993,A3).
I3ush's executive order immediately resulted in an increase in
Chinese immigration-worrying Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) officials, especially because the order
did not have a specific time limit where it would then be
discontinued (Hood 1993, 12). The earliest results indicated
80 percent of Chinese immigrants claiming political asylum
received it (Forney 1993,3).

did include political oppression in the form of racial dis-

On a nationallevcl, asylum applications rose from approximately 30,000 a year in the 1980s to 150,000 a year in the
1990s (U.S. Congress, House 1996). The processing of asylum
claims was held up by a backlog of more that 111,000 cases,

crimination, religious persecution, etc., did not include persecution because of population control policies.

Bush Administration and Political Asylum
In the late 1980s, growing concern over China's recognition
of human rights spurred US. leadership to change the limitations of the asylum policy, especially because of the 1979
decision of the Chinese government to enact the one-child
policy. This law stipulated that Chinese families, because of
the rising threat of over-population, would only be allowed
one child. This was enforced through the local governments,
who also encouraged community members to watch for policy violations. The one-child policy was also enforced
through automatic sterilization and intrauterine devices
(Olojede 1998, A4). During the Reagan and Bush
Administrations, stories of pregnancy check sites-roadblocks
set up by the Chinese police-forced abortions, including
late term abortions, and other stories about destroyed homes
and possessions and large fines, became prevalent in the US.,
receiving public and official response (Hood 1993,12).
In addition to the one-child policy, China further ignored
human rights in 1989 when the government used violent
means to crush a student demonstration in Tiananmen
Square. The event was viewed by much of the American
public and again spurred US. leadership to react.
Congress argued for the U.S. to rebuke the Chinese for their
actions. Both Democrats and Republicans in the House
called on the Bush Administration to at least allow Chinese
students and others (about 45,(00) already in the US. to
extend their visas--even if only on a temporary basis. The
Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, as it became
known, gave non-immigrant status to Chinese nationals who
were staying in the US. as students or visitors and even
granted permanent resident status in some cases (US.
Congress, Senate 1989). In addition to this, the U.S. would
accept Chinese nationals who fled China after the
Tiananmen Square incident. The legislation passed the House
in a vote, 258 to 162 (Kenworthy 1989,A6).
Following this Act, President Bush issued an executive order

meaning that it would take years for U.S. officials to catch up
to the growing demand (Kamen 1991 , AI).While immigrants
w;lited for their asylum hearings, they were granted the right
to counsel and given work permits-allowing them to stay in
the country until their case was reviewed (Boston Globe 1993,
A6). This allowed immigrants to fue for asylum, receive their
work permit, and then "disappear;" in fact, one report stated
that less than half of Chinese asylum applicants in New York
showed up for their hearings (Burdman 1993,Al).
Bush's decision was upheld by his supporters even after he lost
the Presidency in 1992 to I3ill Clinton. I3uh's cabinet sponsored multiple memos on granting asylum on the basis of the
one-child policy. These memos became influential in the handling of immigration cases, where judges even threw out cases
before their hearings-granting asylum by simply writing
"INS policy" on the bottom of the decision (Hood 1993,12).

Illegal Alien Smuggling
Most officials argue that the majority of Chinese who enter
the US. are not valid candidates for political asylum, rather
they know that the immigration law and the current backlog of cases will promise them work permits, allowing them
to remain in the U.S. One Chinese expert stated that it was
"absurd to call these [Chinese immigrants] political
refugees." Some are able to get tourist visas, but don't return
upon the expiration of their legal stay. In order to avoid further deportation, many illegal immigrants are coached by
smugglers to tell INS officials that they will kill themselves
if they are returned to China (Burdman 1993, Al). These
claims often result in at least work permits.
However, smugglers contribute the most to the problem of
illegal immigration and asylum abuse. Smugglers are "organized crime rings that transport illegal aliens into the United
States by land, sea, and air; alien smuggling both adds to the
overall numbers of illegal aliens in the United States and
increases the financial incentives for such trafficking to con-

tinue" (U.S. Congress, House 1996). U. S. officials estimate
that illegal alien smuggling generates a $7 billion annual

become indentured servants, working to payoff their loans for
the passage. They live in quarters provided by their employer,

profit for the smugglers.
Immigration experts claim that there are 200,000 to 300,000
Chinese illegal immigrants (Olojede 1998, A4). The majority
of them are peasants or uneducated workers (Schmetzer
1993, C19). Smuggling has become the prime industry particularly in Fujian province, where those who did succeed in
gaining wealth in the U.S. return to build large homes and
flaunt their new-found prestige (Branigin 1996,A3).

which are often set up by the smugglers themselves (Kleinfield
1993, AI). They typically work in sweatshops, restaurants, or
laundries. And everything is controlled by the snakeheads, even
the immigrants' food source. Obviously, this is an added incentive for the aliens to turn to crime themselves so that they will
be able to survive the pressure of the smugglers (Kamen 1991,
AI). One group of 23 Chinese men, who were arrested for beating up another man, were identified as being new immigrants
who had already joined the smuggler's gang (Kamen 1991,Al). It
is also not unusual for the immigrants to make around two dollars an
hour and work fOr twelve to fourteen hours a day. Some of the

However, this picture of Chinese becoming wealthy in the
U.S. is largely fictitious. In reality, the increased population of
Chinese immigrants in cities like New York have forced
Chinese to live together in squalor--Dne author described it
as being packed in bunk beds, which are only available to
sleep on in shifts (Hood 1993,12).

Methods Used in Smuggling

immigrants are forced into drug smuggling or prostitution (Kleinfield
1993,Al).And the wages are getting worse. As smuggling has
become more prevalent and more immigrants have moved into
Chinatown, employers are able to pay less for the labor, especially in cities like New York and San Francisco, where the smug-

Smugglers have used various routes to transport illegal immigrants, including routes through South and Central America,

gling is the highest (Hood 1993, 12).
When the new aliens cannot make their payments, the snake-

where the immigrants are able to get false American or
Canadian visas O)eStefano 1991,8). Sometimes smugglers
will travel across the Atlantic in order to reach New York,

heads often use torture and scare tactics in order to secure
their money. There have been several cases of kidnappings,
some which included burnings with cigarettes (DeStefano
1991, 8). One Chinese alien was kidnapped at gunpoint from
his apartment, after which he was beaten with a hammerbreaking several of his ribs (Kleinfield 1993,Al). In addition to
this, there have been house burnings and shooting. Obviously,
smuggling has contributed to crime in Chinese communities,
but particularly in New York's Chinatown, where most of the

stopping in various African countries to regroup and collect
more immigrants (Suro 1994,Al).
The most common method before 1993 was by boat.
Immigration officials indicate that as many as 100,000
Chinese have been smuggled into the U.S. via boat (Kamen
1993, AI). The U.S. became aware of this in 1991 when a
boat carrying 132 illegal aliens from China was spotted off
the coast of Los Angeles (Treaster 1993, AI).
Officials believe that businesses and contacts in Chinatown
provide the smugglers with the false identification that they
need. Various gangs in New York's Chinatown that are
thought to have engaged in alien smuggling, including the
Fukien American Association (Hood 1993, 12) and the socalled "White Tigers" (Suro 1994, AI). These organizations, or
others, use individuals called snakeheads to recruit illegal
immigrants and to collect the money for the passage.
Typically, the prospective alien would pay $3,000 to $5,000
to get a local coordinator for the passage-usually to transfer
the person to Hong Kong or Thailand. The smugglers' fee is
$35,000 to $50,000, which one report claims only SI0,OOO
actual pays for the trip itself (Kamen 1991, AI). As a down
payment, the Chinese will pay around $1,500, which used to
be higher but was driven down by the immense competition
in the smuggling business (Kleinfield 1993, AI). The immigrants are expected to repay the snakeheads once they reach
the U.S., even if they are detained in jailor deported to
China. Most of the immigrants are taken to Chinatown,
where they are overseen by the smuggling organizations
(Gladwell and Stassen-Berger 1993,A3). They will in effect

incidents discussed above took place.

U.S. Reaction to Immigration
The increase in Chinese immigration and the simultaneous
increase in crime have led many Americans to be more adamant
about stopping immigration and Chinese immigration in particular. As recorded in opinion polls around the height of the
smuggling, most Americans agreed that illegal immigrants were
an extra burden on the U.S. state and welfare program. One U.S.
representative, Lamar Smith, stated that" illegal aliens take jobs,
public benefits, and engage in criminal activity" (Roddy 1998,
B 1). Some members of Congress started arguing for a stronger
immigration law (Orlando Sentinel 1994,AS).The Chinese government accused the U.S. of encouraging illegal immigration by
having a liberal asylum law. And when U.S. officials demanded
that China control its borders and stop smuggling, they responded by saying that the U.S. should first improve its immigration
law (Forney 1993,3). It seems that the U.S. will have to be the
one who stops the immigration. China was once very effective
in controlling its borders, especially during the Moaist era, but
with international demands for human rights and the increasing
mobility of their people, China would most likely offend human
rights organizations in order to deter further smuggling.
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Immigration officials indicate that as many
as I00,000 Chinese have been smuggled int
the U.S. via boat .
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The Golden Venture
The Golden Venture was the 24th ship carrying Chinese
immigrants between 1992 and June of 1993. Each passenger
was charged $30,000 for the passage that started in
Bangkok. After sailing to Mombasa, Kenya, where the ship
picked up another 199 Chinese, the ship started across the
Atlantic (Gladwell and Stassen-Berger 1993, A3). Later
reports of the voyage indicated that the conditions were
wretched, with the entire group of immigrants being forced
to stay on the lower deck, where it became very hot and
stifling. There was little available food or fresh water
(Freedman 1993, Al). As they approached the New York
shore, two smaller boat~ were expected to come relieve the
ship of its cargo, but when they failed to arrive, the immigrants mutinied. One of the Chinese immigrants gained
control of the ship and started maneuvering it closer to the
shore; however, the ship ran aground off Jacob Riis Park
(Gladwell and Stassen-Berger 1993,A3). Many of the immigrants jumped into the water and started swimming for the
shoreline. Ten of them died, while the rest were brought up
onto the shore by immigration officials (Freedman 1993, AI).
Ninety percent of the passengers claimed political asylum,
mostly on the grounds that either themselves or their wives
had been discriminated against because of the one-child
policy.-;;ome of them claiming to have had forced abortions (Katz 1994, A20). However, immigration officials suggested that they needed to make an example out of the
aliens in order to prevent the problem from growing
(Gladwell and Stassen-Berger 1993, A3). So, starting with
the Golden Venture, Clinton "ordered a crackdown on
immigrant smuggling," beginning a new U.S. policy to
combat the organized smugglers and rampant illegal immigration to the U.S. (Freedman 1993,Al).
The immigrants were sent to detention centers in New
York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia (Arnold 1993, A24). Many
of the immigrants were not allowed bail because of" exclusion proceedings," meaning that because they were still 200
yards off the shore line, the U.S. could detain them in jail
indefinitely without bail until they can be sent back to their
home country (Dillow 1996, A27). The women on board
were taken by the Red Cross, where they were examined
and questioned by immigration officials. All of the women
claimed persecution from China's population laws. Several of
them even had ample evidence of such persecution, but
again, they were transferred to detention centers (Dillow
1996, A27). The crewmembers, including the Indonesian
captain, were charged with conspiracy to transport aliens illegally into the United States (Gladwell and Stassen-Berger
1993, A3). And officials said that the rest of the immigrants
could remain in jail for several months, if not years, until their
cases could be heard in order to determine political asylum.

However, even though the Clinton Administration was recognized for taking a hard stand on immigrant smuggling, immigration officials quickly discovered that the costs of keeping
the ship for investigation was $125,000 (Burdman 1993,AI).
Furthermore, the detention of the immigrants each cost
approximately $65 a day, or $24,000 a year, until their cases
would finally be heard (Arnold 1993,A24). Only a new
immigration law could offer a permanent solution.
Rethinking Immigration Laws Li Huan, China's deputy director
for border defense said that America's law allowed immigrants, as
soon as they landed on U.S. soil, to claim political asylum encouraging illegal smuggling (Schmetzer 1993, C 19). Furthermore, the
law allows the aliens work permits in the mean time, which is
also supporting the criminal clement by enabling the snakeheads
to place illegal aliens into near servitude situations.
The Clinton Administration stated that Bush's policy was
being misused by the Chinese nationals and needed to be
changed (Freedman 1993,AI). However, the U.S. was ill
equipped to take on a more forceful policy. The Coast Guard
was really the U.s's only enforcement, and even then, their
strategies were largely limited to patrolling coastal waters
(Treaster 1993, Al). Therefore, the U.S. had to attempt different methods. One included cooperating with the Chinese
government to advertise the dangers that awaited illegal aliens.
The Chinese government hung posters and showed television
programs made by the U.S. Information Agency, both of
which threatened Chinese to not attempt immigration showing the immigrants from the Golden Venture being jailed
(Kamen 1993, Al). The Chinese government also contributed
by arresting those suspected in smuggling operations, giving
them prison sentences up to five years (Forney 1993, 3).
The U.S. also started making small procedural changes to
their asylum and immigration laws. First, they stated that
those immigrants who had already been in the country for
thirty days could no longer apply for asylum (Brown 1993,
AS). President Clinton also announced that there would be a
higher standard of proof regarding the granting of asylum,
stating that there would have to be substantial evidence that
the person faced eminent persecution in their home country
(Levy 1993, Al 9). And in the case of those claiming asylum
for their country's population control, they would have to
prove that they had been selectively forced to be sterilized or
have an abortion (Katz 1994, A20). The U.S. also tried to
divert illegal aliens elsewhere so that they would not land on
U.S. soil, therefore avoiding asylum claims being made in the
first place. For example, the U.S. persuaded Mexico to allow
the immigrants to land on its shores instead of the U.S. (Tell
1993,18). The National Security Council also permitted the
use of wiretaps, and conspiracy and forfeiture laws to seize
money and property obtained through smuggling, thus dissuading the Chinese crime organizations in the U.S. The
maximum prison sentence for illegal alien smuggling was also

increased from five years to ten. Clinton said that all of this
was meant to send a clear message to smugglers and potential
illegal immigrants (Sure 1994,Al).
Stricter measures were taken with other ships that followed
the Golden Venture. Immigrants from more than a dozen
ships were detained or deported. One ship, named Oops II,
was beached during heavy fog; all those aboard were arrested (Olojede 1998, A4). Another ship, leaving from Honduras
with 524 Chinese, was intercepted by US. officials, and all
the would-be immigrants were diverted back towards China
(Hood 1993,12). US. officials off the coast of Mexico went
as far as to ignore advice from the United Nations workers,
when they stopped a ship carrying 659 Chinese. The U.N.
workers determined that approximately 58 of the passengers
had legitimate asylum claims, but the US. only accepted one
for a hearing (Beck 1993,5). US. courts also started prosecuting smugglers (Burdman 1993,Al).
There was some question over whether these new procedures could prevent legitimate refugees from reaching the
US.; however, this concern was largely overlooked by many

Moratorium Act of 1994 (Ling- Ling 1994, C3) . In the end,
the actions of the INS and various Congress members resulted in a new Immigration Reform Act in 1996 based on the
changes made from 1993 to 1995 and on further reforms.

Immigration Reform Act of 1996
Citing the Golden Venture as the event that prompted new
immigration reforms, the 1996 Immigration Reform Act
states that the U.S. must reassert its own sovereignty over its
borders. As a result, INS was granted more patrol agents,
specifically an annual increase of 1,000 until the end of the
twentieth century, enhanced training procedures, and new
technology to track illegal immigrants (U.S. Congress, House
1996). Also, the initiative granted immigration officials more
authority in dealing with illegal aliens, doubling the penalties
for smuggling ventures, expanding asset seizures, and other
strategies for handling organized crime. A pre-inspection system was also started at various high volume airports around
the world. US. officials would inspect visas and other documents in order to exclude fraudulent cases. If found, these

One activist said that the obstinacy of the INS
they were merely trying to [guard] their
sovereignty, at expense of human rights

9

members of Congress as several of them started introducing
and supporting various reform laws (Arnold 1993,A24).

individuals were turned away from boarding the aircraft (The
White House 1993a). By 1997, the US. Operation Global

One representative from Kentucky, Romano Mazzoli,joined
both a Democrat from New York and a Republican from
Florida in proposing new legislation aimed at stopping illegal aliens from using political asylum (Brown 1993,A5).
Senator Alan Simpson favored a similar proposal, sponsoring
a bill that would prevent foreigners without proper travel
documents from claiming political asylum (Burdman 1993,
Al). Californian Republicans, Robert Dornan and Dana
Rohrabacher, wanted to remove population control as being
grounds for asylum all together (Dillow 1996, A27). Another
Congressman from Arizona, Bob Stump, supported over-

Reach, as it became known, opened thirteen inspection sites
like these in China, South America, and Africa (Bass and
McDonnell 1997,A14).When illegal aliens did succeed in
reaching the US., if their asylum claim was quickly determined to be fraudulent, then the expedited exclusion legislation allowed the US. to deport them back to their native
country quickly (The White House 1993b). To deal with asylum claims, the number of asylum officers was increased by
100 percent (U.S. Congress, House 1998). Also, to alleviate
the lack of detention space, Congress authorized the use of
closed military bases for those waiting for asylum hearings or

hauling the entire system, proposing the Immigration

repatriation (U.S. Congress, House 1993).

Effect of Immigration Reforms
The 1996 Act also cited that there had been a fifty percent
drop in the number of asylum applications following the
Golden Venture incident (U.S. Congress, House 1996). U.S.
officials concluded that it is a combination of these stories
about "ill-fated" ships, increased INS enforcement, and cooperation with the Chinese government that has prompted the
decline (Kamen 1993, AI) . In fact, only one known smuggling
ship landed in the year following the Golden Venture, a ship
that dropped off 110 aliens on a beach in Virginia. Most of
these immigrants were found in a raid and were arrested by
immigration forces (Suro 1994,AI).
Even with the renovated immigration force, smuggling still
remains an option to Chinese who want to flee economic and
political oppression (Cheng 1997,A4) . However, regardless of
this, the problem of illegal alien smuggling has diminished. But
there are other arguments, like those coming from immigration rights groups and other interest groups, which say that the
new immigration laws are rejecting legitimate asylum cases,
especially those fleeing China's population controls.

One effort raised $150,000 (Katz 1997, R21).
However, when one group of lawyers arrived at a detention
center in New York, they were turned away by officials,
refusing to allow the lawyers access to the Chinese. The
officials at the detention center justified their actions by
stating that it is up to the immigrants to get their own
lawyers, but that the detention center was not available for
"lawyers to solicit" business. The immigration lawyers retaliated further by suggesting that the INS was refusing the
immigrants the right to counsel, as guaranteed in the 1980
Asylum Law (Lin 1993, 6) . Furthermore, the immigration
lawyers recognized that the government agents processing
the asylum claims were chosen with the idea of decreasing
smuggling, which immediately set them against the Chinese
immigrants. And the INS, who oversaw the entire operation, was particularly impatient with asylum claims based on
China's one- child policy (Hood 1993, 12). Therefore, the
lawyers decided to ftie suit against the government, claiming
that the INS was violating the 1980 Asylum Law, which
allowed for access to counsel, and the subsequent executive
orders that provided political asylum based on the one-child

respect to the Chinese immigrants showed that
erritory and their own

Immigration Activists and Immigration Reform
The Golden Venture incident, having been the incentive for
immigration reforms, was also successful in provoking attention from human rights groups, anti- abortion groups, and
other activists. This support was particularly bolstered when
the INS detained the immigrants from the Golden Venture
in prisons along the East Coast. Immigration lawyers started
offering their services to the Chinese, and several held meetings in the community. Lawyers and other groups, including
religious groups like the Quakers and even the Catholic
Church, started protesting on behalf of the Chinese immigrants. One paralegal in New York quit her job in order to
work on the immigrants' cases full time (Cheng 1997,07).
Several of the lawyers prepared appeals for the Chinese' asylum claims. And many worked to raise money by selling artwork that the immigrants did both on the ship and in jail.

policy (Freedman 1993, AI) . The lawyers pressed harder with
petitions for asylum, but they were all denied.
As more human rights groups got involved, the immigrants
themselves started to protest. One group of women inmates
engaged in a hunger strike. They claimed that they had fled
China because of the one-child policy and thought that a
hunger strike might gain them attention and more support.
However, the U.S. government largely resisted reaction to
the hunger protest. Eventually, the health of the women was
questionable and the protest was abandoned, though it lasted
for more than three weeks (Katz 1994,A20) . One activist
said that the obstinacy of the INS in respect to the Chinese
immigrants showed that they were merely trying to "[guard]
their own territory and their own sovereignty, at the expense
of human rights" (Maynard 1998). Acting on behalf of the
women, the Vatican arranged for nine of the immigrants to
be transferred to Ecuador. At this point, many of the groups
started protesting and lobbying the government and
Congress members (Katz 1997, R2 l) . Anti-abortion groups
and others opposed to China's population laws lobbied the
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government to make it easier for Chinese immigrants to
receive political asylum. And as the 1996 reform was drafted,
these groups also criticized the government, saying that the
bill would deny sanctuary to legitimate refugees. They were

Conclusion

successful in gaining some support in Congress.
Congressman Henry Hyde from Illinois and Chris Smith
from New Jersey wrote letters to both the Justice
Department and the State Department for sending back
refugees to China, who were then "re-educated" by the
Chinese government. Also, Rep. Smith argued that most of
the immigrants were fleeing China's one-child policy
(Maynard 1998). The Clinton Administration responded by
stating that the Chinese immigrants could get asylum if they
could prove that they "faced persecution based on coercive
family planning policies." However, the result of this
announcement was not what the activist groups had hoped
for, being that only one received asylum. Following this,
Rep. Smith introduced legislation that considered forced

Though the INS and the Justice Department were the larger
winners in the 1996 Reform Act, receiving harsher penalties
for illegal alien smugglers and better enforcement power, the
interest groups that became involved in the plight of the
Golden Venrure immigrants were still successful in guaranteeing the right of Chinese immigrants to claim political
asylum based on China's one-child policy. Furthermore,
these activist groups were successful in making the Clinton
Administration reverse its policies toward the Golden
Venture immigrants, by eventually setting them free from
detention. Before the Golden Venture, American immigration policy was engineered to serve the purposes of the
Cold War, to protect the U.S. relationship with China at the

abortions and sterilizations grounds for political asylum,
independent of Bush's executive orders but under the new

same time as opening the U.S. borders to those fleeing the

1996 reforms (Katz 1994,A20).The law was finally changed

oppressive Chinese government. However, these generous
policies were largely abused, creating a national dilemma,

in 1997, allowing population control as a basis for political
asylum (Katz 1997, R21). The law provided for a total of
1,000 refugees under this section of the asylum reform act
(U.S. Congress, House 1996).
However, the most significant win for the human rights
groups came in 1997, when President Clinton, reacting to the
relentless lobbying, released the remaining victims of the
Golden Venrure (Katz 1997, R21). Clinton granted them "safe
haven," being that they were fleeing China's one-child policy.
Only 53 remained from the original 300, but it still represented a significant number (The White House 1997). This
marked a serious switch in the Clinton Administration, who
had decided to take a hard line with illegal immigration. This
latest act worried some that it would again promote smuggling

I

I
i

I

particularly in terms of violence and the increasing existence
of organized crime groups. The Golden Venture incident was
used by the Clinton Administration as an example to curb
illegal immigration and smuggling actions. This tactic was
rather successful, though it sparked a debate within the U.S.
as to whether harsher immigration policies could hurt the
cases oflegitimate refugees, as the activist groups behind the
Golden Venture argued. The 1996 law, which reformed the
immigration policies of the Eighties and the Bush
Administration, eventually included the arguments of these
interest groups, illustrating the influence of interest group
politics on the making of foreign policy.

I

and crime, but the lawyers who worked with the Chinese stated that they would stay close to them and help them to
become settled in the u.S. without having to rurn to crime.
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THe UTaH WILDerness DeBaTe:
Interest Group Influence
and the Utah Public Lands Management Act
By David Hymas
Photography by Ricardo Rosas

WILDerness DeSIGnaTIOn Has LOnG Been a THorny Issue III UTaH.
NOWHere IS THIS more True THan III THe DeBaTe over WILDerness DesIGnaTIon on LaIlD COnTrOLLeD BY THe Bureau OF LanD ManaGemenT
(BLM) III UTaH. "OF THe 54,344,423 acres III UTaH 21.8 percenTls prIVaTeLY owneD, STaTe aGenCIeS COnTrOL 10.5 percenT ann FeDeral aGenCIes
COnTrOL 63.4 percenT" (WOOLF 1996,Al). OF THe 63.4 percenT, 41 percenT
IS manaGeD BY THe BLM. AS a resuLT, UTaH FInDS ITseLF CaUGHT
BeTWeen THe InTereSTS OF THe STaTe anD THe FeDeraL GOVernmenT.

While the issue has had a long history in Utah, it came to a head in 1995 with Rep.
James Hansen's (R, UT) Utah Public Lands Management Act (H.R. 1745) . The bill looked to
have an easy road to passage as Hansen had just become chairman of the House Subcommittee
on National Parks, Forests, and Lands, and the newly elected Republican 104th Congress focused
on an admittedly less stringent environmental agenda. Yet, despite an easy ride through the subcommittee, Hansen pulled the bill from a full floor vote because it lacked votes. Its Senate counterpart, S. 884, was brought down by a filibuster from Sen. Bill Bradley (D, NJ). Given the initial
support for the bill and the Republican majority this outcome was curious. Indeed, the debate
over the fate of some obscure redrock areas in Utah became one of the biggest environmental
debates of the 104th Congress. This paper will seek to explain how environmental groups
achieved this victory. More specifically, it will explore the relationship between the bill's defeat
and strategies used by the Utah Wilderness Coalition (UWe) and the Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance (SUWA) . It will look at the history of the bill and wilderness in general, the origins of
these groups, and strategies they used to defeat HR 1745. Finally, it will build a theoretical framework around their origins and strategies and how they relate.

HISTOIT OF WILDerneSS DeSIGnaTIon
Wilderness designation began as a government policy in the 1920s with the Forest Service
designating some forest lands as wilderness. Wilderness received Congressional protection with the
passage of the Wilderness Preservation Act of 1964. The act stated "it is hereby declared to be the
policy of the Congress to secure for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness" (Wilderness Preservation Act 1964). It originally set
aside nine million acres of federal land as wilderness and outlined a system whereby more wilderness could be added. Since the act's passage, the federal government has designated more than 100
million acres as wilderness areas (about 4 percent of the nation's land) (Hamilton 1994,47).
According to the act, land qualified as wilderness under the following conditions: (1)
the land "appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature with the imprints of
man's work substantially unnoticeable" [essentially meaning it is roadless); (2) "has outstanding
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation"; (3) it must be at least
5,000 acres in size (4) there are areas of "ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value"; (5) there is a possibility that the land will return to a natural
state if left alone (Wilderness Preservation Act 1964).
Under the Wilderness Act (and later the Federal Land Policy Management Act), the
federal government commissioned studies on the land it managed to help determine how much
land qualified as wilderness. The Forest Service inventoried Utah lands under its jurisdiction in
the early eighties, and a bill designating 800,000 acres passed in 1984. The Carter administration,
and later the Reagan administration, commissioned the BLM to study about twenty-two million acres it managed in Utah. Out of the twenty two-million acres, the Bureau found about
3.1 million acres they thought might qualify as wilderness. In its final recommendation, the
bureau proposed designating 1.8 million acres as wilderness (Bureau of Land Management
1980).Green groups, like the Sierra Club, SUWA and the UWC, complained that in addition to
the Wilderness Act's criteria, the BLM added their own, such as excluding large amounts ofland
because of possible mineral resources, findings from field research teams being rewritten by the
state agency, reduced opportunities for solitude because oflack of vegetation, and excluding land

because of periphery development next to roadless areas of small uncoordinated efforts by national environmental
(Utah Wilderness Coalition 1990). The agency also exclud- groups like the Wilderness Society, previous to SUWA and the
ed land with roads, while the environmental community UWC there had not been any interest groups to form any kind
wanted to extend wilderness boundaries around some of of countervailing power in Utah. According to McFarland,
them. The BLM defended their inventory process as being in these groups would give the BLM more autonomy to make
accordance with the Wilderness Act's guidelines, while con- decisions and be the power broker between business and enviservationists said the process was flawed, leaving out many ronmental interests. Without countervailing power, the BLM
areas that should have qualified.
only heard one side of issues on land it managed.
Wilderness designation hurts business interests more
The BLM's favoritism to business and ranching
than other designations because no other policy has proved to interests also influenced the attitudes of early group founders
have such a far reaching effect at stopping development. and members. The experience of some of SUWA's early
"National parks can be developed to accommodate motorists; founders, most notably Clive Kincaid, greatly aided this
wildlife refuges can be logged, or drilled, or ravaged by speed- process. The Wilderness Society had hired Kincaid to review
boats and snowmobiles; wild-river designation protects only the BLM's wilderness inventories in the four corners areas.
narrow bands of habitat" (Hamilton 1994, 46). A wilderness He became so disgusted with the process, he and a small
designation, on the other hand, only allows visitors to use non- handful of others started SUWA to combat the BLM's efforts
mechanical transportation, i.e., hiking, canoeing, horseback, (Smith 1998, 6). While Salisbury would probably classifY
etc. Thus, grazing can continue, for example, as long as ranch- Kincaid as a political entrepreneur, it was some time before
ers do not use mechanical means of
transportation.
This idea of protection IS
critical to understanding the issue 111
Utah and other states. Conservationists
DeVeLOpeD IS TO Have IT DeSIGnaTeD as
realize that the best way to keep land
from being developed is to have it desWILDerness. AS a reSULT, WILDerness
ignated as wilderness. As a result,
Has Become a KInD OF "HOLY GraIL"
wilderness has become a kind of "holy
For Green OrGanIZaTIons.
grail" for
green
organizations.
Moreover, once land is designated as
wilderness, it takes another act of
Congress to change it, which can be a difficult proposition.
he began to receive large benefits from the exchange with
early members (Salisbury 1969). Residents of Escalante
FOrmaTIOn, STraTeGIeS anD THeOreTICaL FrameworK
burned him and other founders in effigy and used their picThe Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance was formed tures to sight in their rifles (Smith 1998). One could classifY
partly in response to the 1984 Utah Wilderness Act, which the early foundations of SUWA as a grassroots victim orgadesignated wilderness in Forest Service lands. The founders of nization (GVOs), despite the perceived harm was to the
SUWA saw 800,000 acres as a paltry number and vowed to environment, not the founders. Foreman would see Kincaid
not allow the same thing happen on BLM land. The Utah as a organizational entrepreneur because he had experienced
Wilderness Coalition was formed to combat the BLM's the BLM's "threat" firsthand and organized a group to do
inventory process. The UWC did not agree with the BLM's combat it. Early leaders could use their anger and frustration
findings, so they completed their own inventory of Utah's with the BLM's "lack" of consideration for their views to
public lands. After months of field checking, map making, and drive the beginnings of SUWA. Foreman also differentiated
photographic documentation by a network of volunteers, the between community based and condition based GVOs (1995,
UWC proposed 5.1 million acres be set aside as wilderness 33-53). SUWA is an example of a community based GVO
(this later increased to 5.7 million).
because the group formed in the Southern Utah areas around
These events would seem to point to Truman's dis- the most intense conflict.
turbance theory (1951) or Salisbury's homoeostatic mechaEarly leaders were inexperienced, however, in
nism theory (1969) with the Utah Wilderness Act and the grassroots organization, so in 1988 SUWA hired Brant
BLM's 1.8 million acre recommendation acting as the shocks Calkin and Susan Tixier. This fact presents an interesting
to the system. Truman would see the early members and later addition to Salisbury's political entrepreneur theory, which
growth of these groups as latent groups. However, the inter- describes how entrepreneurs set up organizations. When
esting thing in this situation was not how the two groups political entrepreneurs, e.g. Kincaid and other early founders,
reacted to other interest groups, but to the executive agency. lack skills needed to keep a group growing rapidly, they
Environmental groups have traditionally argued the BLM recruit other political entrepreneurs. Calkin and Tixier were
favors grazing, mining, and other development interests over experts in national grassroots organization, strategies the
environmental interests.
original political entrepreneurs had not worked a lot with.
This fact involves several iron triangles or power tri- Calkin had been board president of the Sierra Club and
ads (McFarland 1992) that have developed over time. Outside Tixier had been involved with several different public inter-
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est causes. Calkin and Tixier took SUWA in a different direction as they began to branch out across the nation in search
of members and patrons, rather than concentrating on
Utahans. In their six years with the group, SUWA went from
1,000 to over 10,000 members. They also established a fulltime presence in Washington to oversee Congress and the
Administration. These strategies were to pay large dividends
in future battles over H.R. 1745.
The UWC is also an interesting organization. Its
administrative base is quite small because its early founden
set it up as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of other green groups like the Sierra Club, Wilderness
Society, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) and
others from behind the scenes. The UWC has grown to
more than 35 member organizations, each of which is a
tremendous asset because each brings established resources
that the UWC can use in its campaigns. The UWC has
focused on gaining Congressional support for their 5.7 million acre proposal. As Berry pointed out, the success of a
coalition is more likely if it allows member organizations to
claim credit for successes (1997, 194). The UWC has been
effective at coordinating efforts without being seen in the
public eye as much as member organizations.
In his essay on coalition formation, Kevin Hula
pointed out several interesting ideas that seem to hold with the
UWC (1995,239-58). He divided members of coalitions into
core groups, specialists (or players), and periphery members.
Core groups are those groups forming strategy for the coalition, founders, and resource rich interest groups. Specialists are
groups who want to shape specific policies within the broader context of larger policies. Periphery groups are those who
join simply to be seen with the coalition.
In this case the Sierra Club, SUWA and even the
UWC itself could be classified as core groups. Groups like the
Wilderness Society would be specialists because they were more
interested in the specific idea of wilderness, rather than the
broader issue of other kinds of environmental protection within Utah. The Wilderness Society was formed in the 1920s and
1930s around the goal of preserving wilderness on U.S. Forest
Service Lands, making it a more nationally based organization.
There were also a number of periphery groups that
wanted to tag along with the cause. Smaller interest groups,
especially in the West, began to advertize the issue in order to
lend support and gain exposure. For example, through their
limited efforts, the Western Ancient Forest Campaign
(WAFC) has gained exposure from the issue. Currently, they
are pursuing strategies similar to ones used by the UWC to
get more wilderness designation on Forest Service lands. By
associating with the UWC, WAFC could gain credibility and
contacts in their wilderness endeavors. There were also corporations that could be considered periphery groups.
Companies like REI and Patagonia used money, publicity, and
supplies for the reinventory process to support the coalition
rather than any particular lobbying resources. They were able
to gain exposure through the UWC's efforts by linking their
names with the coalition. Finally, to broaden the coalition's
base, several sportsmen's organizations joined. For example,
the Utah Bowhunter's Association is a member of the UWe.
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In THe InTerIm
BeTWeen THe BLM'S
recommenDaTIon anD

OrGanIZaTIons anD Sliwa's
memBerSHIPS weLL
exceeDeD 10,000.

This is important because these groups are outside the normal scope of environmental groups. Indeed, many see the
members of hunting groups opposed to most environmental
agendas. Because they represented a larger set of interests,
these groups could give more credibility to the uwe.
Hula also points to the large problem, similar in
nature to membership within interest groups, of freeriding in
coalitions. Larger coalitions may even reach a point where they
resent periphery members. The UWC, on the other hand,
needed support in large numbers in order to "get the word
out." They did not have the luxury of being selective about
those who wanted to join the coalition. The UWC also differs
from other coalitions with the autonomy they retained given
the larger groups, like the Sierra club, within the coalition.
Hula claims the resources individual groups bring to the coalition determines group strategy. If this is true, the Sierra Club
and other large members would likely playa larger role in the
group and could hinder some of the coalitions autonomy. One
explanation for the UWC's autonomy is the fact the wilderness is completely within Utah. National environmental group
membership within Utah is not large. These groups may lend
resources and help to the UWC because their ideologies and
goals are similar, but their membership base outside of Utah
probably would not drop significantly if they lost the issue.
Contrasted with the Headwaters Forest (an attempt to protect
a large section of Redwood trees) campaign outside San
Francisco, where a large portion of the Sierra Club's members
live, Utah wilderness is probably not as high a priority. In addition, the Sierra Club cannot call upon a large member base
within Utah to help with the issue, forcing the UWC look to
other organizations to augment its support.
The early organization of SUWA and the UWC
combined with the slow process of getting the BLM recommendations to Congress in legislative text allowed SUWA
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and the UWC to mature slowly and gain support gradually in
Congress and from citizens. By thc time Rep. Hansen proposed his Utah Public Lands Management Act in 1995,
SUWA and UWC wcre strong enough to bring to light many
of its inadequacics. If the bill had comc immediately aftcr the
BLM's 1.8 million recommendation in 1991, its fate may have
becn different. The issue was localized and obscure nationally, and the Democratic majority may not have had enough
information to be familiar with it. Senator Bradlcy may have
still filibustered the bill, but his incentive for fl.l.ibustcring would
havc been less clear. By the time hc filibustered thc bill in the
spring of 1996, it had become national news allowing him to
branch out beyond his New Jcrsey constituency. In the interim
between the BLM's recommendation and Congressional
action, the UWC swelled to over 100 environmental organizations and SUWA's membership well exceeded 10,000. This
may have been very important for Sen. Bradley because many
had speculated that he was interested in running for president,
and indeed, his recent declaration that he will oppose Al Gore
for the Democratic nomination for president in 2000 lends
credence to this idea. The Utah issue allowed him to get his
name out to more people.
Following the BLM's recommendations, Rep. Jim
Hansen (R, UT) wrote a bill that would have designated 1.8
million acres of federal land as wilderness (later increased to
2.1 million) and released 1.4 million acres ofland protected
as temporary wilderness study areas (WSA's) to development
(U.S. Congress, House 1995). Environmentalists saw Hansen's
bill as one that favored industries over preservation. Beside the
lack of acreage, they objected to language in the bill that
returned any land in Utah not set aside as wilderness to multiple-use designations. Multiple-use designation allows development, off-road vehicle use, and many other uses wilderness
designation would preclude. Federal lands in Utah could
never be considered for wilderness again. Normally, the
bureau manages land in WSA's as wilderness unless it is designated something else or until Congress acts. H.R. 1745
took that power away from the BLM and gave some of it to
state agencies. This prevented federal agencies from protecting
land with other designations like national parks and monuments, despite the fact that the BLM had seen enough
redeeming value in them to designate them as WSA's. This
"hard release language" angered most green groups. The bill
also protected any projects or developments that were in the
"public's best interest"; an inclusion aimed specifically at protecting water projects already planned in the wilderness areas.
Environmental groups claimed that this would violate the
intent of the '64 Wilderness Act and significantly alter its
meaning (Nyhan 1995,2178).
For SUWA and the UWC, Hansen's bill loomed
like disaster on the horizon. They had to pool their resources
and make an all-out effort to defeat the bill. Their efforts werc
aided by the fact the UWC had written their 5.7 million acres
citizen proposal into bill form in 1989. Rep. Wayne Owens (D,
UT) sponsored the bill, but in 1992 he was defeated in a run
for the Senate. America's Redrock Wilderness Act, H.R. 1500,
was reintroduced by Rep. Maurice Hinchey (D, NY) in 1993,
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but republican opposition, especially from thc Utah delegation, kcpt the bill from ever leaving the subcommittee. With
Hansen as chair of the Subcommittee on National Forests,
Parks and Lands, members of the Subcommittee dcfcated
150021-9, choosing instead to concentrate on Hansen's proposal (Bcneson 1995,2359).
The UWC had to concentrate on what could be
considered an outsidc-in strategy. This is a combination of
Wright's inside and outside strategies. Wright examined interest group roles in lobbying legislators as they wrotc bills and
how those lobbying efforts help formulate policy within the
bill (1996,39-40). Thesc kinds oflobbying practiccs would be
considered by most to bc an insider strategy.Thc citizen's proposal, however, was written entirely by thc UWc. It was not
watered down with various markups or compromises. Oncc
it was written, the UWC shopped it around until they could
find a sponsor. This cnabled them to hold firm on specific
issues, but has, morc than likely, hindered more widespread
support. So while the Coalition did usc Congress mcmbers to
get their bill to thc floor, it would pursue a route not often
taken n trying to get the bill passed.
With Hanscn as chair and a Republican majority,
thc UWC could not mustcr enough support for H.R. 1500
within the subcommittec, so they took it to the rest of
Congress. This is where Calkin and Tixier's efforts really paid
off. By establishing a Washington office years before and
focusing on a national membership, the UWC could bring
acute attention on thc bill on a national level. Legislators who
did not know where most of these lands were receivcd calls
from constituents within their districts, grabbing their attention morc quickly. The UWC also used this advantage in
fighting H.R. 1745. Members across thc nation could call
their Congress mcmbers in opposition to Hansen's bill and
suggest an alternative, H.R. 1500. Environmental groups recognizcd there was no way to get their bill through Hansen's
subcommittee, so they focused on an outside-in strategy
inside Congress to get thc necessary 218 votes (a majority of
the House) to bring the bill directly to a floor. By the end of
the 104th Congress, SUWA and the UWC had amassed 116
cosponsors in the House. Pursuing this kind of strategy has a
huge cost of time, but according to the UWC, "we are lining
up support now for America's Redrock Wilderness Act, so we
will have something to build on in the futurc" (Utah
Wilderness Coalition 1 997, 1).
This time constraint provides a possible advantage
to environmental groups. Hansen noted that policy makers
will prefer interest groups over political parties when interest
groups have a comparative advantage over political parties in
providing electoral information and mobilizing constituents
and when an issue is recurring (Hansen 1987). The wilderness
question in Utah has dragged on for more than a decade with
no end in sight. This fact aided SUWA and UWC because
policy makers have turned to them in larger numbers as they
demonstrate their ability to provide electoral information and
mobilize the electorate. Despite their differences in opinion,
recently even the Utah delegation has proposed including
SUWA in forming a compromise bill. This points to the

stature SUWA has achieved over time.
SUWA has focused intensely on motivating the
electorate and organizing grassroots efforts. They initiated a
number of successful strategies in bolstering opposition to
Hansen's H.R. 1745. As noted before, the time between the
origin of SUWA and the UWC contributed significantly to
their success in defeating the bill. Using a mix of outside and
inside strategies, SUWA and the UWC were able to mobilize
members and the pubic to speak out against Hansen's bill.
First, Rep. Hansen and Governor Mike Leavitt
held hearings on the bill in five different Utah cities. Only
one of these meeting was held in an urban area, despite the
support wilderness enjoyed along the Wasatch Front. Using
an outside strategy, environmental groups put out the call to
arms and packed the meeting houses, causing many rural
locals to accuse SUWA of "fixing" the hearings. Pro-wilderness Utahans turned out en masse at all five public hearings.
"Wilderness advocates were in the majority at each of the
meetings even though four were held in remote rural areas.

NUmBer OF Acres
No Wilderness Acres
1 Million Acres
1.9 Million Acres

SUPPOIT (Ill perCenTaGeS OF UTaHanS POLLeD)

4·5
12.3

11.6

(approx. amount in 1745)

2.9 Million Acres
3.2 MillionAeres
5,7 Million Aeres
Agree With None

10.1
23.2
30.6

This public opinion gave environmental groups the
power to go before Congress members and lobby more effectively. By demonstrating to them that they had support in
Utah, and that the bill had become extremely unpopular in
the Congress as a whole, they could offer them a political
prize by placing them on "their side." Once on the environmentalist's "team", groups could identifY the Congress member with the support in the West.
Third, as the pressure mounted and H.R. 1745
gained momentum, using an inside strategy SUWA staffers
swarmed to Washington to lobby Congress (SUWA 1995).
Again the fact they had already established a Washington
office, combined with the continual efforts of members of the
UWC, enabled SUWA to step quickly into the fray. In addition, members of the UWC, such as the Sierra Club and
Wilderness Society, were able to mobilize their resources in
opposition to 1745. As Berry noted, different niches existed
for the particular resources of a given group (1997, 204).
Different groups in the coalition used their particular
strengths and contacts to fill these niches and lobby Congress
more efficiently and effectively.
The Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, among
others, both appeared before the Subcommittee to testifY
against the bill. The Sierra Club is famous for its lobbying of
Congress members by professional lobbyists (Wenner 1990,
285-6). The Wilderness Society divides its energies into the
following three areas: "research and analysis of issues, education and constituency building among the public, and policy
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Source: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests. and Lands

Of the 22,000 comments collected by the governors office,
73% were in favor of [H.R. 1500]" (SUWA 1995,5).
Second, SUWA also initiated a huge public campaign against 1745. Using another outside strategy, they
urged members to target papers in Utah and across the
nation with editorials and letters to the editors. Papers across
the nation began to run letters on an issue many people had
never even heard of. Articles and editorials against 1745
appeared in western papers like the Salt Lake Tribune,
Deseret News, Las Vegas Sun, the Santa Fe New Mexican,
and the Denver Post. This was followed by coverage from
national publications and news organizations like the New
York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, Time, Rolling
Stone, USA Weekend, CBS, CNN, and NBC News (SUWA
1995,4). Utah public opinion also turned on the bill. The following poll from 2 News in Utah showed most Utahans did
not agree with the wilderness acreage contained in H.R.
1745. A clear majority, 63.9 percent, of Utahans preferred
more wilderness than was designated in 1745.30.6 percent
preferred the previous bill, H.R. 1500, that Republicans had
so easily defeated in subcommittee.
This proposal was based on environmental group
numbers, and neither the BLM nor any other government
agency ever proposed such a large number. In fact, the ELM
could only find 3.5 million acres that even qualified for
wilderness, yet the public supported the 5.7 number.

BY DemOnSTraTInG TO THem THaT THey
HaD SUPPOIT In UTaH, anD THaT THe BILL
HaD Become eXTremeLY unpOPULar In
THe ConGreSS as a WHOLe, THey COULD
OFFer THem a POLITICaL PrIze BY PLaCInG
THem on "THeIr SIDe."

advocacy within Congress and ... [its] agencies" (321). While
the Wilderness Society may not have qualified as a specialist
group under Hula's definition, testifYing before Congress and
providing information on wilderness was not a difficult
stretch. Because they had these kinds of resources prior to the
UWC, the UWC was able to use them when they were
needed most. These groups' resources were greatly augmented by the specialized resources of the UWC and SUWA who
had concentrated on the specific Utah issue. The UWC and
SUWA were able to relate information to other members and
aid them in their statements against the bill.
Finally, SUWA staged an impressive grassroots campaign, a classic outside strategy. Letters from across the nation
began to pour into Congressional offices. SUWA also
encouraged and helped pay some of the costs to fly active
members to Washington to personally lobby their respective
Congress members. Berry noted that grassroots campaigns
often combine mail and member visits to Washington with a
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group's lobbying efforts prior to a close vote (1997, 134-5),
and this case was no exception. "Authors Terry Tempest
Williams and Stephen Trimble traveled to D.C. to give
Congress copies of Testimony, a collection of poems, essays,
and stories defending Utah wilderness, written by twenty
western writers including a Pulitzer Prize winner, a National
Book Award winner, and a former U.S. Poet laureate. A coffee
table book on Utah by author Brooke Williams and photographerTom Till was donated for distribution to U.S. Senators"
(SUWA 1995, 4). Other high-profile, outspoken members,like
Robert Redford and former Rep. Wayne
Owens, used their connections in Washington
to lobby Congress members as well. SUWA
also developed a high-tech, interactive
lnternet site coupled with an e-mail action
alert list to inform members instantly about
changing developments in the debate.
With this increased member activity and mobilization, House and Senate members had to declare their support or opposition
to 1745.With the decline in strength of political parties, the electorate is less likely to solidly identifY themselves with the platform of a
given party. As a result, parties prefer to remain
more ideologically vague and less issue-oriented. In Berry's words, interest groups are
policy maximizers and political parties are
vote maximizers (1997, 47). Single-issue
interest groups have helped defme the issues
with politicians. They have served to put the
candidate on their side or "the other side."
This is especially disheartening for candidates
who want to avoid declaring themselves on
the issues (Oberstar 1983,616-23).
Environmental groups have used
this fact to defme issues to their advantage, as
was the case in defining the support and
opposition to 1745. By placing candidates in
"their camp" or the opposing camp, the
UWC and SUWA helped the electorate
know who supported what. Oberstar, Berry
and Wright have all pointed out how modern technology has made this ability even
more powerful with the advent of television,
computerized mail techniques and professional public relations experts. These mediums allow interest groups to bypass political
parties and reach the electorate directly. This
contact was especially important in the
opposition to 1745 because Republicans had
a majority in Congress. SUWA and the
UWC needed effective ways, such as e mail, newsletters, faxes,
etc, to communicate directly with supporters.
Furthermore, use of wilderness areas has increased
since the 1970s (Lucas 1989, 41-55).This is particularly significant when one considers that this use translates into more voters
being able to understand what is in some of these wild lands. The
task, then, for the UWC and SUWA was to motivate and alert
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this section of the population to the Utah issue and help them
understand how it would affect them, despite the fact they may
never visit Utah. Newsletters, newspaper campaigns, and the
lnternet were all effective ways to help those outside Utah know
about the issue and see how it would affect them.
Oberstar noted Anthony Downs' theory on beating
an incumbent in talking about single issue interest group
strategies. According to Downs, an incumbent could be
defeated when the following three conditions hold true:
"First, a majority of the citizens are in a minority

on at least one issue under consideration. Secondly, when in
the minority a citizen has a more intensely held preference.
Third, the opposition need not commit itself on any of the
issues under consideration until the incumbent has
announced his position" (Oberstar 1983,621).
Downs' theory can also apply to a bill or policy that has a
majority backing like 1745 did. This theory is significant

because of the intensely held preferences of the environmental groups and their supporters, especially in the West. Policy
makers in opposition to 1745 could identifY with these supporters and gain their backing. Congress members did not
need to commit themselves to either side of 1745 until after
the bill was introduced in Congress and environmental
groups had showed its national appeal. Environmental groups

Rep. Hinchey (a first term representative) could use the issue
to show their constituents their support for the environment.
Even Sen. Bill Bradley (D, NJ) became involved, as he eventually filibustered the Senate version of the bill. As noted
before, some have speculated this was an attempt to gain
national support for a possible bid at the Democratic nomination for president in 2000. He had considered running for
president in 1996, and some analysts had even
linked him as a possible running mate to Ross
Perot in 1992 or with Colin Powell in 2000 (Rose
1995) . Environmental groups handed him the Utah
wilderness controversy with its national exposure
on a silver platter.
CONCLUSION

were able to operate on their "intense preferences" to help
gain support for their side. Rep. Hansen and his supporters,
representing the incumbent, had already staked out their
position with the bill's introduction. Environmental groups
made it next to impossible for anyone supporting the bill to
court the "green" vote because they had immediately come
out in opposition. They created a dichotomous choice for the
electorate and policy makers.
The UWC and SUWA could use 1745 to help
other candidates outline their environmental agenda. No
longer was the issue unique to Utah or even the West, with
the intense lobbying efforts and grassroots work being done,
it had become a national issue. Congress members such as

While H.R. 1745 did skate through the House
Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and
Lands (Beneson 1995,2359), once it reached the
House floor, support dried up, and the bill was
pulled to escape an embarrassing defeat, though
Hansen and other members of the Utah delegation
claimed that it was pulled in order to receive more
debate (Woolf 1995, AI). The UWC and SUWA
had achieved a victory many did not think possible
in the face of the odds against them. The groups
showed how a combination of inside and outside
strategies can help defeat a bill despite initial support within Congress for the bill.
This issue saw the extensive use of lobbying both at the national and state level. Strategies used
by SUWA and the UWC support Wright's theory
about how interest groups will approach Congress at
different stages of a bill's progress (Wright 1196,75113). Wright asserted that groups will first try to
influence the formulation of a given bill. Second,
they will try to influence policy makers by testifYing
and submitting written comments at hearings and
markup sessions. Finally, groups will focus on the
floor and conference action in Congress. They do
this by heightening their presence in Washington and
forming broad based coalitions. Grassroots organization is also important at this stage.
The Utah wilderness debate followed
these steps closely. In the early stages groups tried
to affect 1745's formulation by pushing for 1500.
Admittedly they had a hard time in the Republican controlled subcommittee, but they could use 1500 to try and
soften the language within 1745. When this was not successful, as noted previously, UWC members, like the Sierra Club,
SUWA, and the Wilderness Society, testified against 1745 in
hearings. SUWA and others also submitted letters and other
written comments to be entered into the official record in an
attempt to influence members (U.S. Congress, House, 1995).
Many wilderness advocates were able to attend the local hearings held in Utah, allowing them to testifY rather than submitting comments. Finally, after the bill passed the subcommittee, groups swarmed Congress members. SUWA staffers
flew to Washington along with different members of the
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group. SUWA and the UWC intensified the grassroots campaign to try and bring pressure upon Congress members
across the nation. Outspoken members and influential friends
lobbied Congress on behalf of the bill. The UWC also intensified its efforts in lobbying. The coalition was aided by the
fact it had broadened its base and expanded its membership
in the previous years, giving it more resources to usc.
The debate also shows the importance of a maturation period for an interest group. Talking about the early days
of SUWA, one founder said,
"".Working on leads, loans, and favors, [we] met
deadline after deadline on environmental assessments and
appeals. Our board could wait for its by-laws, a typewritten
newsletter would be put off another month, and T-shirts were
a good idea, but who had time? We fed off an adrenaline
cocktail: the visceral mix of gorgeous country, death threats,
and the unwavering support ofjust about every desert rat living in redrock Utah" (Smith 1998,5-6).
Early on, the groups simply did not have the resources, members, money, or staff to sustain the kind of grassroots and lobbying effort they did in response to 1745. Gais and Walker
call this a strategy of survival, one that is necessary for a
group to grow (1991). This is a key lesson. Groups must recognize issues quickly and try to delay them, so they can grow
strong enough to combat them. Policy makers, who want to
get laws through the process quickly, must try their best to
get issues through the system as fast as possible in order to
avoid future complications. This debate also points at a glaring problem with pluralist theory. Countervailing power
takes time to organize, meaning many issues may get through
the cracks before Truman's latent groups can organize. The
1984 Utah Wilderness Act demonstrated how iflatent groups
cannot organize fast enough, legislation they might oppose
can pass without receiving their input.
Unless a dramatic change occurs in Congress (such
as occurred in 1994), the UWC and SUWA groups will continue to pursue the status quo and passage ofH.R. 1500.They
mobilized the constituency effectively enabling them to wield
power when dealing with Congress members. This power
translated into promises of eventual votes. By turning the
issue into a national one, they helped promote their own
issues with the help of members outside the Utah. This support was vital considering the Utah delegation's enthusiastic
support of 1745. The same techniques will probably decide
future public land debates. Whoever can mobilize the constituency the best will attempt to influence candidates with a
vested interest in the issue.
The history of H.R. 1745 also lends some credence to Gais and Walker's theory of when groups will use
inside and outside strategies. They theorized groups will
increase their use of inside and outside strategies as the conflict of an issue increases. This was certainly true in this case.
SUWA and the UWC used a combination of lobbying
strategies coupled with grassroots organization as the conflict
surrounding 1745 heightened. However, this experience
would weaken their assertion citizen's groups usually concentrate on outside strategies. Even early on, SUWA was try-
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ing to influence BLM policy, and the UWC was trying to
counter the BLM's inventory process. They appeared at open
hearings held by the agency and consistently challenged their
findings. These activities were long before they had enough
members to initiate a large grassroots campaign. Gais and
Walker did not claim citizen's groups exclusively use outside
strategies, yet their static examination of a dynamic relationship may have left their analysis with some holes.
In addition, the coalition created by the UWC
contributes to Hula's theory on how coalitions motivate the
electorate by using their specific strengths. A~ discussed earlier, the UWC used different strengths of its members to lobby
Congress, support a grassroots campaign, and "get the word
out." One interesting side note to Hula's theory is how time
was an ally to the UWC. The coalition took time to develop.
It was a dynamic process over the space of a decade, allowing
members and staff to learn on the job. By the time the showdown with 1745 came, members of the coalition were ready
to fight it. More important, they had the resources to fight it.
Finally, a note on the future of Utah wilderness. As
of August 1, 1996, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt
announced a new study of 2.5 million federally managed
acres in Utah previously deemed unsuitable as wilderness by
the BLM. Various "career professionals" will decide the fate
of the land and attempt to finish the study in about six
months (Woolf 1996, Al). Considering the first study took
over a decade and cost millions of dollars, the process will be
difficult at best. Rep. Hansen has struck back saying that is it
illegal to do two studies when the law only called for one.
Several firms, like the Utah Counties Association, filed suit
against Babbitt, but were defeated in early March 1998 in
federal district court. The case is under appeal.
For the near future, no change seems likely. While
environmental groups won a battle in 1995, public support
might begin to wane as they desire closure. This happened in
Montana as the state witnessed sixteen bills concerning
wilderness allotments get defeated in just over a decade. The
UWC and SUWA have continued to seek cosponsors for
America's Redrock Wilderness Act (they currently have over
130) and Rep. Hansen is attempting to introduce several new
"compromise" bills. More than likely, Utah citizens are in for
a long political fight because as long as an agreement is not
reached, Utah will continue to have the government managing over 3.2 million acres as wilderness. Anyone who has
studied Congress knows that it is much easier to stop something from passing than to ramrod a bill through to law. This
is the irony; compromise has not been considered between
the 1.8 and the 5.7 million acre figures, assuring Utah twice
the number proposed in 1745. Environmental groups remain
quite happy with the results.
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"In my opinion the conscientiuons scruples of all men should be treated
with great delicacy and tenderness ... and it is my desire, that the laws
may always be as extensivevely accommodated to them, as due regard
for protection and essential interest of the nation may justify and permit. "
Geroge Washington

1.

Introduction
In order to maintain an appropriate barrier between church and
state and insure the propagation of religious freedom, the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution specifically limits the federal
government's authority to legislate in regards to religion. A~ such it
is commonly understood and accepted that Congress may not
make laws that have the specific intent of either supporting or hindering religious groups. However, if a law of general applicability
(one which does not single out religion as a category for intentional
treatment or mistreatment) does have the effect of incidentally burdening religious practice, its legitimacy is less certain. Most argue
that if these laws do in fact hinder the practice of religion and thus
violate a basic constitutional right, then they should at least be heavily scrutinized, if not automatically ruled as unconstitutional.
Recendy, however, that understanding has failed to capture a
majority in the honorable opinions of the Supreme Court.
In June 1998, both houses of Congress proposed legislation
intending to afford a greater protection of religious liberties.
Supported by a diverse coalition of more than sixty religious and
civil liberties groups, the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA)
seeks to remedy the burdens of these generally applicable laws
upon religious practices left otherwise exposed by the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Aores (City of Boerne v.
Aores 1997,2157). This is not a new ballie for Congress. In wake
of the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith
(Employment Division v. Smith 1990, 872), Congress similarly
responded with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
in 1993. Passing with overwhelming support, Court observers
thought that this put an end to the issue. However, the Aores decision effectively nullified RFRA as unconstitutional, thus prompting supporters to regroup and try again with RLPA.
This debate over federal law with regards to religious liberty has indeed been a heated process in the last
decade. It has prompted serious discourse in at least two fields
of study. First, it has raised legal questions dealing with Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence, basic structural questions of
separation of powers, federalism and the status of fundamental rights. Second, it has provided political scientists with
copious material in analyzing the relationships between the
various branches of government. From the latter perspective,
interplay, particularly of Congress and the Court, is a model
of policy decision making in which the various branches
engage in "an ongoing and, ultimately, productive dialogue
about the meaning of First Amendment religious liberty protections" (Devins 1998, 647). The working out of this dialogue demonstrates an interactive process and "reaffirms the
original constitutional understanding that the court and the
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President and the Congress (not Congress alone) would
determine statutory policy" (Eskridge 1991,617).1
In this essay I will discuss the proposed Religious
Liberty Protection Act, considering both its legal concerns
and its political considerations. I proceed in Part II by outlining a historical look at religion and the Constitution in this
past century as it relates to the current controversy. From this
perspective it is easy to discern how the Court's historic
Smith decision departed drastically from the correct and
established precedent of protecting religious liberty, and how
rather than simply passing as a momentary whim of bad
jurisprudence, the court strengthened its stand in Flores seven
years later. I further explain how RLPA seeks to fulfill the
mission of RFRA by making up for the latter's constitutional shortcomings. In Part III I look at the political game
through a positive political theory model developed by
William Eskridge, Jr. (1991). Viewed as an interactive and
dynamic game, Congress may rightfully be seen as having
challenged the Court when it proposed RFRA, and I discuss
whether the Flores decision was a predictable or appropriate
response to such a "turf" challenge. Part IV concludes that
RLPA is facially constitutional, and that if it can muster the
same overwhelming support as RFRA, it should be held as
such. To the extent that the Supreme Court recognizes and
shows deference toward Congress's power under the
Spending and Commerce Clauses, RLPA should withstand its
scrutiny.

::?

A Legal Understanding

A. From Lochner to Smith
Any time the Supreme Court reviews a law to
determine its constitutionality, it can employ one of two basic
tests. The majority of cases are subject to a simple rational
basis test which only requires the government to demonstrate
that the law in question is "rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose" (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996,573). Other
times the court has seen fit to subject laws to a more heightened scrutiny. This test requires government to assume the
burden of proving that a given law is "narrowly tailored" to
serve a" compelling" state interest. This more stringent review
has been applied (and arguably misapplied) in various types of
cases throughout constitutional history. For example, during
the early part of this century, a very laissez-faire minded
Court liberally applied strict scrutiny to any case of economic concern, effectively usurping legislative power by over-

turning many state and federal statutory laws. This trend,
beginning as it did with the case of Lochner v. New York
(Lochner v. New York 1905, 45), became known as the
Lochner era. Under pressure from legal scholars and the other
branches of government, the Court began to limit its use of
this test and "rather firmly established that it will afford
heightened or strict scrutiny where the law under review
either contains a suspect classification or impacts a fundamental right" (Lee 1993, 80) .
This is probably as it should be. As discussed below
in Part III, a respect for democracy should prompt the courts
to adopt an attitude of deference toward the legislatures in
general, while still protecting the fundamental rights of
minorities who do not as easily gain access to the political
process. The obvious difficulty, then, is determining which
rights are "fundamental" and thus subject to strict scrutiny.
Mter all, the Constitution neither explicitly nor implicitly
denotes a hierarchy of rights. Historically, fundamental rights

have been defmed as those which fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause as determined by the
courts. Yet, whatever the list may include, we can assume that
religious liberty is numbered among them, at least since
Cantwell v. Connecticut (Cantwell v. Connecticut 1940,296).
In this case the Court determined that "the fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth) Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment"
(Cantwell v. Connecticut 1940,303). This, of course, includes
the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, this principle of applying strict scrutiny to laws which infringe upon the free exercise of religion (even if only incidentally) became established
at least by the time of Sherbert v. Verner (Sherbert v. Verner
1963, 398), and further strengthened by Wisconsin v. Yoder
(Wisconsin v. Yoder 1972, 205). In both of these cases, a generally applicable law had the effect of hindering the free exercise of religion. In both cases, the court recognized the need
to protect this fundamental right and judged the respective

statutes according to the strictest scrutiny. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger reemphasized the basic principle:
"[Only] those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance the legitimate claims of free
exercise of religion" (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996, 1593, emphasis
added). It seemed that the standard was set.
Then in 1990, the Court made an unprecedented
move in the case of Employment Division v. Srrrith (Employment
Division v. Smith 1990, 872). When members of the Native
American Church were denied unemployment benefits after
being fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, they ftled suit
claiming that the existing controlled substances laws effectively
burdened the free exercise of their religion. Court observers waited to see whether the statute would be upheld or if it would fail
to survive strict scrutiny. As it turned out, the statute was upheld
without surviving this rigorous test; it did not have to because the
test was not invoked. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia abandoned the compelling interest test for generally applicable laws
that do not single out religions and only incidentally inhibit religion. (Employment Division v. Smith 1990,878).
Though he is not wholly without precedent, this
decision flips the prevailing standard on its head. Attempting
to show consistency, Scalia first tries to dismiss the idea that
generally applicable laws which only incidentally burden religion are subject to strict scrutiny. He claims that only laws
specifically aimed at prohibiting religion merit this test.
Indeed he accuses respondents of"carry[ing] the meaning of
'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion], one large step further" (qtd. in Stone et aI. 1996, 1599).
This notion is silly for two reasons. First, historically
the Supreme Court has been asked to review few laws that
specifically target religion; it simply has not been a considerable
problem. The most common and controversial cases dealing with
the Free Exercise Clause are those which are generally applicable. As Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion points out:
Generally applicable laws are [not] "one large step" removed
from laws aimed at specific religious practices. The First
Amendment ... does not distinguish between laws that are
generally applicable and laws that target particular religious
practices ... Our free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly burdening a religious practice (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996, 1603,
emphasis added). Second, to declare that religious liberty is
not burdened if the effect is only incidental is preposterous.
Indeed, Yoder clarifies that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and
thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under
regulations of general applicability ...
A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion (qtd. in Lee 1993, 87).Scalia further attempts to show consistency by dismissing this clear precedent ofYoder, claiming that
the Court only applies strict scrutiny in hybrid cases. That is, he
claims that burdens to free exercise from neutral, generally
applicable laws can only receive heightened First Amendment
protection when coupled with other "constitutional protections
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such as freedom of speech and of the press ... " (Stone et al. 1996,
1600). This seem, to imply that the fundamental right of religious freedom is only secondary to other rights and alone is
insufficient to invite the most considerable protection and the
strictest scrutiny. This claim, too, seems unconvincing. As stated
by Rex Lee, The first freedom of the First Amendment is the
free exercise of religion, and nothing in the text, history or previous judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause suggests that this freedom must depend upon some other constitutional guarantee for protection (1993, 88) .Furthermore,
while he cites Yoder in defense of this proposition, Scalia fails
to recognize that the Court's opinion in that case affirmed "that
the Free Exercise Clause (by itself) often requires exemptions
to generally applicable law" (Lee 1993,88).
From this point, Scalia's argument only worsens. He
does admit that respondents are not demanding an unqualified nullification of every law that hinders any minority religion anywhere, but are simply asking for the most heightened
scrutiny to be invoked in such cases.Yet, he denies this request
in a long chain of unconvincing arguments. First, he says that
it only applies to unemployment compensation cases (which
is a questionable response since Smith is such a case) and that
even if extended beyond such, it could never apply to criminal cases. Second, he claims that the only reason they apply
the test in such cases is under "the proposition that where the
State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may
not refuse to extend that system to cases of'religious hardship'
without compelling reason" (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996, 1601,
emphasis added). Again, it leaves one wondering why religious freedom is not a good enough reason to independently merit its own "individual exemption."Third, he defends the
compelling interest test in cases of racial inequality and free
speech cases, but contends that the effects of applying this
stringent test to Free Exercise cases would produce "a constitutional anomaly" (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996, 1601).As if this
is not sufficiently blatant, he concludes that protecting the
Free Exercise portion of the First Amendment by the most
stringent means available is a "luxury," and that "[a]ny society
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy" (qtd. in
Stone et al. 1996, 1602).
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion adopts the attitude
and has the effect of relegating religious freedom and toleration
to second-class status which Scalia dismisses as an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government" (qtd. in Stone et al.
1996,1603). In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor criticizes the Court on each of the above assertions. Ultimately she
challenges her colleagues to fulfill their obligation of protecting
minority rights, subjecting all challenged laws under Free Exercise
claims to strict scrutiny in "a case-by-case determination of the
question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim" (qtd. in
Stone et al. 1996, 1604). After all, as the language of the Clause
itself makes clear, an individual's free exercise of religion is a preferred constitutional activity... The compelling interest test
reflects the First Amendments mandate of preserving religious
liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. For the
Court to deem this command a luxury [is] to denigrate '[t]he very
purpose of a Bill of Rights' (qtd. in Stone et al. 19961605).

B. RFRA-A legislative response
Recognizing the necessity of protecting religious
liberty as a fundamental right (at least on par with free speech
and racial equality) immediately reached beyond the Court's
minority to Congress. In the following years, lawmakers from
both houses of Congress proposed several versions of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). In 1993, with
overwhelming support in both houses and great commendation by President Clinton, RFRA became law. It responded
to Smith by legislatively mandating that "[g]overnment shall
not burden a persons' exercise of religion, even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability" unless such a law
can survive the most heightened scrutiny (U.S. Congress
1993, sec. 3(a)-(b)). Simply stated, RFRA sought to restore
the most stringent protection of what historically recognized
as a fundamental right. The important concern with surviving as constitutional, however, resided in effectively establishing a "head of power" from whence Congress could claim
legitimate authority for enacting RFRA
According to the bill itself, Congress derives constitutional authority from Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Granting Congress the power "to enforce by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article" (qtd. in
Lee 1993, 90), and recognizing that First Amendment rights
are adopted as part of the "fundamental liberties" of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Cantwell v. Connecticut 1940,303),
RFRA is asserted as such "appropriate legislation." This is
legitimized by at least three Supreme Court decisions. First in
Ex Parte Virginia, the court held that What-ever legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the
equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if
not prohibited is brought within the domain of Congressional
power (Ex Parte Virginia 1880,345-346, emphasis added).
Second, in Katzenbach v. Morgan the Court reaffirmed that
Section Five is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment" (Katzen bach v.
Morgan 1966,651). The Court has dubbed this power "remedial" in that it can enforce Fourteenth Amendment protections and guarantees, though it cannot declare its constitutional substance. Finally, both of these previous cases were
reaffirmed in the more recent case of City of Richmond v.
J.A.Croson, Co. (City of Richmond v.J.A.Croson, Co 1989,
469). In her majority opinion,Justice O'Connor even quotes
Ex Parte Virginia in stating that both the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment "were intended to be what they really are, limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements
of the power of Congress." (qtd. in Stone et al. 653). Besides,
the type oflegislation that has historically been most suspect
and thus most adamantly scrutinized by the Court, is that
which limits or narrows minority rights. Why? Because leg-

Simply stated, RPRA sought to restore the
most stringent protection ofwhat historically recognized as a fundamental right.
The important concern with surviving as
constitutional, however, resided in effectivelyestablishinga 'nead ofpower"from
whence Congress could claim legitimate
authorityfor enacting RFRA.
islation often has the effect of hindering some amount ofliberty somewhere, and that hindrance will be felt most acutely
by minority groups which cannot as readily protect their
interests through the political process. It has then traditionally fallen to the courts to protect these rights and liberties.
However, RFRA proposed just the opposite; Congress went
out of its way to protect minority rights. As such, one would
think that the Court would have readily accepted this legislation. Unfortunately, as discussed below it did not. Thus, the
usual paradigm of Congress inhibiting minority rights and
the Court defending these rights has been reversed in this
past decade. We are left to wonder why the Court has taken
this unnecessarily hostile stand against religion. As Rex Lee
observes, "[f]rom the standpoint of constitutional policy, giving those within a suspect class [minority religions] a lesser,
rather than a greater, protection is the ultimate perversion"
(1993,95).
In 1997, the Supreme Court heard the case of City
of Boerne v. Flores (City of Boerne v. Flores 1997,2157). In this
case, Flores, the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, was
denied a building permit for enlarging a church because the
church was located within a historic preservation district. Flores
filed suit claming protection under RFRA. In its decision, the
Court concluded that RFRA was unconstitutional because it
exceeded Congress's power to enact it. In the majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy rehashed all the old arguments of Smith and
reaffirmed the Court's stand. He then turned to examine the
central question regarding the legislative authority by which
RFRA was enacted. As anticipated, the argument centered
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around the distinction of Congress's Section Five power as
being remedial rather than substantive. Kennedy concedes the
argument made above-that Section Five is indeed "a positive
grant oflegislative power"-but also warns, "that '[a]s broad as
the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited'''(U.S. Supreme Court 1997, 6).At its substance, his argument
follows that Congress's authority is limited to simply enforcing
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment; it cannot defme or
interpret the constitutional substance. If such a violation of

best. H e acknowledges that the respondents already recognize
this distinction and simply claim "that RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress's remedial or preventative power ... [and] is a
reasonable means of protecting the free exercise of religion as
defmed by Smith" (U.S. Supreme Court 1997, 10). Finally, he
turns to considering whether or not this is so.
Providing a series of arguments that are no better
than those found in Smith, the Court does conclude that
RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or

authority is demonstrable, then RFRA must be unconstitutional-first, for compromising principles of federalism and second,
for violating the established structure of separation of powers.
To this extent, Kennedy follows a historical overview
of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a series of
Supreme Court opinions supporting this remedial/substantive
dichotomy.This is instructional, of course, but probably moot at

preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It
appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections (U.S. Supreme Court 1997 ii, emphasis
added).Of course, the questionable reasoning as to how the
majority arrives at this conclusion is not significant for this
essay. At the very least we must accept that RFRA is uncon-

stitutional, if for no other reason than that the Court said so.
The point is that if Congress now hopes to provide a legislative
remedy through the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA), they
will need to find a new constitutional " hook," and be sure to satisfy the demands of federalism and separation of powers concerns as
understood by the Court in Flores.

D. RLPA -Another chance?

On June 23, 1998, Professor Michael W.
McConnell of the University of Utah School of Law
addressed the Senate Judiciary Committee during hearings
on the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) . In this
address, he clearly and convincingly defended RLPA as an
appropriate and constitutionally sound remedy to the defi-

ciencies of RFRA as outlined in Flores. Specifically, he
responded to the three-part challenge of: (1) identifying an
appropriate constitutional footing or "head of power"which
will, (2) preserve the integrity of the structured separation of
powers and, (3) satisfy the demands of federalism.
As recognized above, the danger of declaring
Congressional authority from the Section Five enforcement
power is that the Court always has the prerogative of declar-

ing any statutory provision as having crossed the line from
remedial enforcement to substantive interpretation . Such was
the downfall RFRA. Congress viewed Smith as having minimized the protection afforded to religious liberty, but its
response was invalidated because the Court saw it as an
assumption of power beyond the authority of simply enforcing constitutional rights. Notice, however, what the Court did
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not say: Flores did not suggest-and no other precedent of
the Court suggests-that there is anything improper about
the Congressional objective of protecting religious freedom
beyond the constitutional minimum, so long as Congress does
so through other constitutionally vested powers (McConnell
1998,2, emphasis added).

A. America's Constitutional Democracy

With RLPA, Congress has chosen as its "other constitutionally vested powers" those found in the Spending and
the Commerce Clauses to offer a fuller protection to religious
liberty "beyond the constitutional minimum." As such, it
avoids the shady issue of violating the separation of powers,
because there is no judicial authority to be usurped; they
merely assert their power in protecting religion as a statutory
right (on par with environmental or disabilities concerns)
rather than as a constitutional right. Avoiding any questionable
constitutional interpretation, Congress simply declared religion as "an important human value that [itl can promote to
the full extent of its constitutional powers" (McConnell 1998,
2). This seems especially safe since, in the last half of the century, the Court's established precedent has been to uphold
Congress's Spending and Commerce Clause authority to legislate "beyond the constitutional minimum." Similarly, while
the court has concluded that neutral and generally applicable
laws cannot violate the Free Exercise Clause, that does not
prevent Congress from protecting religious freedom under the
Spending Clause and Commerce Clause (McConnell 1998,3)

During the battle over the Constitution's ratification, both
Federalists and Anti-Federalists considered the power of the
judiciary. In debating judicial review (the authority to rule on
the constitutionality of laws), the two sides, represented by
"Publius" and "Brutus" respectively, actually found a lot of common ground. Both agreed that the proposed Constitution
allowed the Courts to have the final say in it<; interpretation and
application in reviewing all laws. Indeed, Publius asserts that the
Constitution delineates this power accordingly:The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the
judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act
proceeding form the legislative body (Chadwick 1987,423).
They also agreed that the justice's independence and life tenure
during good behavior would effectively strengthen the Court's
power and lead to judicial review. The only argument was
whether or not this would be a good thing. I argue that it is.
Any democratic form of government derives its
authority either directly or indirectly from the people. While

demonstrate the relationship as it is played out in the course
of the policymaking process. Finally, I will demonstrate that
the model fails to fully explain Flores, and seek to offer a
proper explanation as to why this is so.

"With RLPA, Congress has chosen as its "other constitutionally vested
powers "those found in the Spending and the Commerce Clauses to offer a
fuller protection to religious liberty" beyond the constitutional minimum. "
Federalism concerns are also ameliorated in RLPA,
especially due to the Commerce Clause section. Precedent
clearly reserves to Congress (over the States) the right to regulate behavior outside of commercial considerations under the
authority of regulating commerce. To the extent that a particular activity demonstrably affects or touches on "interstate
commerce," it falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause,
and is thus regulable. Since much of the free exercise of religion
will affect and be affected by commerce (such as the Flores situation),RLPA can justifiably exercise that power over any State
prerogative. As McConnell concludes, "[t)he Commerce Clause
is our constitution's means of demarcating the federal from the
state spheres of regulation" (McConnell 1998,5).

3. The Political Game
In this section I am primarily concerned with
exploring the politics of the Smith-RFRA/FIores-RLPA
"game" being played between the various branches of government. I will begin by establishing a general theory of how
the branches (specifically Congress and the Courts) should
work together within the constitutional framework. I will
then introduce a model based on game theory which seeks to
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the Founders favored this idea of popular sovereignty, they
also feared the excess and abuses of such a system-particularly the problem of majority faction. That is, they also sought
to protect minorities who are otherwise left unprotected from
the will of the majority. Therefore, they established a system
which effectively combines "majority rule" with the appropriate structures to protect minority rights. The simplest way
to do that is to constitutionally declare rights, and provide for
a branch of government that can enforce those rights irrespective of the majority. The judiciary fulfills this role, and has
historically provided the means of relief for minorities whose
voices are otherwise stifled by the political process; this at least
assures that their fundamental rights are not also stifled. Thus,
as Rex Lee asserts, "Constitutional rights are, by their nature,
minority rights" (Lee 1993,75)
The difficulty comes in recognizing that the Court
can exercise tremendous control in the realm of policymaking that is otherwise reserved for Congress. This is not to say
that the oversimplified paradigm of a tripartite government,
where the three branches exercise total and complete power
in their sphere, separate form the respective powers of the
others, is correct or even desired. As Richard Neustadt so succinctly stated, the Constitution did not provide a government

of separate powers, "[rJather it created a government of separated institutions sharing power" (qtd. in Nivola and
Rosenbloom 1990,331). However, a respect for democracy
should still dictate to the Court a general "attitude of deference toward the legislature, and a consequent reluctance to
rule against constitutionality" (Lee 1993, 78). Of course, the
Court should pay close attention, because legislative policy
choices, reflecting the will and efforts of the majority, tend to
limit minority rights. When this happens, the Court has the
obligation to intervene and overturn such laws. As we have
already seen, strange constitutional and political questions
arise when just the opposite happens-when Congress
attempts to implement legislation that strengthens (rather
than limits) minority rights.

turned by another player with the authority to do so.
4. Resulting from 1,2, and 3, each player has an "indifference
point" which is the point on the political spectrum that the player likes just as much as another point in the opposite direction
5. The veto median (V) is the point that divides congress with
one-third on one side and two-thirds on the other side of the
spectrum. This is obviously important for the president who is
contemplating a potential veto (Eskridge 1991, 644-5).
Played on a linear field from left (liberal) to right (conservative), the game exists within a political alignment that demonstrates the climate in which it will be played, and which should
dictate the outcome. In the early to mid 1990's, the configuration would resemble.

Figure 1
B. Positive game theory analysis
One way to describe the interplay between the
branches of government is with a game model. Professor
William Eskridge Jr. offers such a model relating to this interaction over civil rights legislation (1991). In it he describes how
certain legislative acts (especially the Civil Rights Act of 1990)
have been implemented by Congress in attempts to overturn
what they see as judicial misinterpretations. This has some readily apparent similarities to the situation we have discussed herein. Indeed, smacking of RFRA both in name and language, the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 declared that its purpose,
is to reaffirm pre-Grove City College judicial and executive
branch interpretations and enforcement practices which provided for broad coverage of the anti-discrimination provisions
of these civil rights statutes (qtd. in Eskridge 1991, 636).
Similarly the Civil Rights Act of 1990 declared that, in a series
of recent decisions addressing employment discrimination
claims under Federal Law the Supreme Court cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights protection. This bill responds to the Supreme Courts recent decisions
by restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically
limited by those decisions (qtd. in Eskridge 1991,638).
Notice, also, that by narrowly interpreting the statutes, the
Court had effectively limited minority rights that Congress
tried to strengthen, as in the RFRA-Flores situation. As mentioned above, this abandons and reverses the usual paradigm
of Congress limiting, and the Court protecting such rights.
Assuming, then, that we are dealing with similar circumstances (albeit with religious freedom rather that civil rights)
we can try to apply this model.
The players of the game are the Supreme Court
(C), the "legislative gatekeepers" (G), the Congress as a whole
(M), and the President (P). The game begins with the Court's
interpretation of a statute. It then flows in the pattern C JE G
JE M JE P JE M in which each player decides how it will
respond to the previous play within its scope and power
(Eskridge 1991,644). These responses are subject to and constrained by the following considerations and assumptions:
1. The game is played in the sequence outlined above.
2. Each of the players acts on complete information and knowledge thus perfectly anticipating the "future course of play"
3. No player will want to "make a decision that will be over-
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This simply means that during this era, the Court
(C) has taken a more conservative stance on its religious freedom preferences than Congress (M) and the President (P),
while the "gatekeepers" (G) are at least slightly more liberal
than Congress as a whole. The indifference point (G (M)) is
equidistant from G, in the opposite direction than M. Thus,
when the game begins, the Court should abandon its policy
preference and compromise on a stand at or just to the left of
M. This is dictated by assumption #3 because,if the Court
implements its own preferences (C) through interpretation ... it will be overridden, because the gatekeepers will have
an incentive to introducing overruling legislation (they prefer
any x < C, and the ultimate result M < C), and Congress will
vote for its preferred outcome over that of the Court (it
prefers M to C) (Eskridge 1991,.650).
Unfortunately, when RFRA came up for review in
Flores this is exactly what did not occur. Rather than deferring
to Congress and abandoning its Smith jurisprudence, the
Court reaffirmed and took a strong stand at C. According to
the model, this should not have happened. This, of course, is
only going to invite a legislative override with complete support of the President, ultimately resulting in a loss for the
Court. Why would the Court do that, and why does the model
not account for it? The inconsistencies may be explicated by
simply altering the model as Eskridge did when he found such
anomalies in his case study. By amending the model with
"informational assumptions," he assumes the game to be even
more dynamic such that policy preferences are formed and
determined during the game in response to the arguments of
the other players (Eskridge 1991,656). This leads to two alternative explanations in our example.
The first is called the "information variation" and
declares that "the Court will stick to its preferences and try to
persuade the gatekeepers and Congress of its views" (Eskridge
1991,658). However, reading Flores one does not exactly feel
like the Court was trying to persuade; it comes across more as
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Game Over
backlash at Congress for challenging its Smith holding. The
second possibility-the "distributive variation"-asserts that
the Court may have tried to shift leftward from its preference
toward M, but "was simply mistaken about the congressional
median" (Eskridge 1991,658). This, too, fails in our example
because with the broad (almost unanimous) and intense congressional support of RFRA, there could clearly be no mistake
in judging M's position. Besides, there is nothing to suggest
that the Court shifted at all; on the contrary, it simply appears
that they thumbed their noses at the legislative branch, openly
inviting further challenges. According to the model (even after
amending), this is a foolish move for the Court, because it will
inevitably lead to a legislative override and thus allow
Congress to win the game. Assuming that the justices possess
good political savvy, we must admit that the model simply fails
to explain this exchange for some reason or another.
The problem lies in the assumption that the SmithRFRA-Flores game is similar to civil rights game used by
Eskridge. While I pointed out some superficial similarities
between the two, there is one significant difference: the model
was designed to deal with various interpretations and preferences of statutory policy, while the Court in Flores raised the
question to the level of constitutional law. Quite simply, feeling challenged by the inflammatory rhetoric of RFRA, the
Court sought to "protect its turf and institutional legitimacy"
(Devins 1998,650). Knowing they could not do so on the normal playing field described by our model, they raised the game
to the higher level of constitutional interpretation. At this level
the Court clearly has the home field advantage and needs only
to invoke its authority to "say what the law is" (Marbury v.
Madison 1803). By upping the stakes in this way, the Court
sends a clear message to Congress:
It is difficult to predict what the outcome ofRLPA
will be. It did not pass in 1998, but it will assuredly be proposed again this session. However, at this point it is uncertain
whether or not it will even be enacted. Mter all, Congress will
be reluctant to risk the time and political capital on a battle
they cannot win-it is no fun playing when you know your
are going to lose. Besides, the lack of substantial harm to religious liberty may not warrant any more challenges at the federallevel. Consequently, the issue may have lost some salience
to politicians who do not perceive it as important to their
constituents. Put simply, Congress just may not be willing to
"take it to the mat" again. If that is true, then what is next? As
I see it, there are three things that could happen.

4. Conclusion
First, RLPA might become law. If this happens, it does
stand at least a fair chance of survival. Since it does not hinge on
the questionable interpretation of the substantive/remedial powers of the Enforcement Clause, the Court should no longer perceive it as a threat to their judicial authority. However, if the
Court is still determined to enforce its position, it might fight the
bill on the issue of federalism in reviewing the Commerce
Clause. Second, the question may simply have to remain at the
state level. Indeed, many states have already adopted their own
RFRA legislation. Third, Congress may seek to pass a
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Constitutional Amendment. This is, of course, unlikely given the
difficulty and improbability of approving such an amendment let
alone it~ ratification; right now they do not even have enough
interest or support to pass it as a normal legislative act. Regardless
of what happens, it is of great significance that the issue has presented itself for our consideration. Religious liberty is a fundamental right that we are guaranteed under our noble
Constitution, yet if we fail to fully understand and protect that
freedom, we may not recognize when it is taken from us. Worse
yet, we may not care. Especially in the types of cases discussed
herein, when the threat to religious freedom comes from benign,
generally applicable laws, we mll~t recognize that the effects are
no less real or disastrous than if intentional. Thus, we cannot
afford to be apathetic and simply go on living in the anticipation
of peripheral concerns and problems with little concern for religious freedom issues. This is particularly true of our current preoccupation with Y2K and the end of the world. Of course, when
that does occur and the Good Lord comes down to usher it all
in, then as Rex Lee points out, "all laws should be generally
applicable" (Lee 1993,96).

I
,;;;

works cited
Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
City of Boerne v. Flores 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
City ofR.ichmond v.J.A. Croson, Co. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Chadwick, Michael Uoyd, ed. 1987. The Federalist. Springfield, VA: Global
Affairs Publishing.
Devins, Neal. 1998. How not to challenge the Court. William and Mary Law
Review 39 (February): 645-64.
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
Eskridge, William N. 1991. Reneging on history? Playing the
Court/Congress/President civil rights game. California Law Review 79: 61384.Ex ParteVirginia 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
Katzenbach v. Morgan 389 U.S. 641 (1966).
Lee, Rex E. 1993. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative
choice or judicial review.
BYU Law Review 1: 73-96.
Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
McConnell, Michael W "Hearings on S. 2148, Religious Liberty Protection
Act of 1998, before the Senate committee on the Judiciary." Lkd. Justice
Fellowship, at"Religious Freedom Legislation." 23 June 1998.
<http ://www.justicefellowship.orgirlpa_analysis3.html>
(23 November 1998).
Nivola, Pietro S; and David H . Rosenbloom. 1990. Classic R eadings in
American Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Sherbert v.Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Stone, Geoffiey R., Lois M . Seidmand, Cass R. Sunstein, and Mark V. Tushnet.
1996. Constitutional law. 3rd ed. Aspen Publishers, Inc.
U.S. Congress. House. 1993. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
ended bill (H.R. 1308). 103d Cong., 1st sess. Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office.
U.S. Supreme Court. "City of Boerne v. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio, et
al." Lkd. Findlaw, at "United States Case Law" and "Supreme Court." 25
June 1997. <http://laws.findlaw.com/US/000/95-2074 .html>
(9 November 1998).
Wisconsin v.Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Brigham Young University
Religious Freedom: Fundamental Liberty, Statutory R.ight or Less?
Nathan Dullum 11 December 1998PISc 361 (Edwards)
"In my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should be treated with
great delicacy and tenderness: and it is my wish and desire, that the laws may
always be as extensively accommodated to them, as a due regard for the protection and essential interests of the nation may justify and permit." George
Washington

"writing is the art of binding the world wi,th words ... .,

